

Evaluating Chinese GDP Growth using the Keqiang Index

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While Chinese GDP growth has undoubtedly been impressive, there has been much skepticism with regards Chinese economic data reporting. To address this somewhat, Premier Li Keqiang created the Keqiang Index (comprising 40% of both bank loans and electricity consumption growth along with 20% of rail freight growth) in order to better proxy economic growth in China. In this paper, we use the Keqiang Index to evaluate Chinese economic growth by comparing the Keqiang Indices of other Southeast Asian countries to China's Keqiang Index. We consider the accuracy of Chinese economic figures and find that China seems to over-report its economic growth data. Additionally, we found a slowdown in Chinese economic growth in recent years.

1 Introduction

1 Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China,
2 there has been much skepticism of official Chinese eco-
3 nomic data. For example, Economist Thomas Rawski
4 pointed out that between 1997 to 2000 official Chinese fig-
5 ures state that Chinese real GDP grew by 24.7%, whilst
6 energy consumption decreased by 12.8% [7]. This seems
7 highly unlikely as China was industrializing at that time.
8 To further highlight this discrepancy, Rawski compares this
9 data with other Asian countries' energy use and shows that
10 in each case, energy usage has grown in parallel with real
11 GDP [7]. Recently, China's National Bureau of Statistics
12 reported that the economy grew 8.1% for all of 2021; This
13 would be the fastest GDP growth in a decade [8]. Com-
14 pared to the US's mere 3.8% GDP growth and China's
15 2.2% growth in 2020, the numbers do not seem to correlate
16 [8]. This data falsification is believed to occur, according to
17 economist Carsten A. Holz, in rural areas because leaders
18 tend to only want good news as they are solely evaluated by
19 the economic performance of their area of management [7].
20 To combat this issue, many Chinese companies or politi-
21 cians create their own measures of Chinese GDP, such as
22 skeptic and premier Li Keqiang with his Keqiang Index.

24 In a document released by Wikileaks back in 2010,
25 in 2007 then-head of the Chinese Communist Party in
26 northeastern Liaoning told then-U.S. Ambassador to China

27 Clark Randt that he only "focused on just three data points
28 to evaluate Liaoning's economy: electricity consumption,
29 rail cargo volume, and bank lending." [9] "By looking at
30 these three figures [one could] measure with relative accu-
31 racy the speed of economic growth. [Whereas all] other
32 figures, especially GDP statistics, are for reference only,"
33 according to Li [9]. In a similar vein, the Keqiang Index,
34 created and used by the 7th Premiere of the People's Re-
35 public of China Li Keqiang, is a measurement of Chinese
36 economic growth which is comprised of the annual growth
37 rate of outstanding bank loans (weighted 40%), electric-
38 ity consumption (weighted 40%) and rail freight (weighted
39 20%) [6]. The Keqiang Index is much more volatile than
40 China's official GDP, but that would be expected as it only
41 includes three factors [6]. Li Keqiang claims that this index
42 can reliably measure the speed of economic growth com-
43 pared to Chinese GDP figures.

44 Bank loans have always been a concrete way of mea-
45 suring money supply - increased money supply results in
46 higher rates of production and manufacturing, and vice-
47 versa. Because the Chinese economy is based on manufac-
48 turing, the country uses much electricity; Electricity con-
49 sumption is a great factor in measuring economic activity
50 as changes in output tend to correlate with changes in elec-
51 tricity usage and also can be easily verified by sources with-
52 out relation to the Chinese government [7]. Similarly, rail
53 freight can also easily measure economic activity. China

has the busiest railways on the road and has well-developed rail infrastructure, and slowdowns in railway freight can signal a slowdown in the economy. This index allows anyone with access to data on these factors to measure Chinese economic activity. Researchers John Fernald, Israel Malkin, and Mark Spiegel used the Keqiang Index to verify Chinese GDP figures from 2000 to 2009 and then to predict China's GDP from 2009 to 2012 [7]. They found no major discrepancy in the relationship between GDP and the Keqiang Index, including during the 2009 to 2012 global slowdown, offering some validation of the Chinese figures [7]. In this paper, we repeat such an analysis, but with regards to other Southeast Asian countries reliant on manufacturing to better understand whether skepticism of Chinese GDP figures is warranted.

As we evaluate Chinese GDP, we also note that since around 2010, China has been slowly shifting towards a service economy. Journalist Peter Cai from the Lowly Institute notes, "At the end of 2015, the services sector accounted for more than 50% of GDP. Over the same period, the manufacturing sector dropped to 41% of GDP." [2] As such, the use of the Keqiang Index is better suited for the pre-2010 period as compared to the post-2010 period. However, we will still apply such analysis to post-2010 years as a weaker proxy for GDP growth.

2 Methodology




Figure 1: Flowchart representing our methodology for verifying Chinese economic growth data using the Keqiang Index.

We expect that the Keqiang Index to %ΔGDP ratio between industrializing countries reliant on manufacturing and exports to be about the same. Therefore, we selected three Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Vietnam) with these characteristics to compare against China. For these countries, we were able to gather outstanding bank loans, electricity consumption, and annual rail freight data to construct Keqiang Indices. We then used their reported GDPs to construct the Keqiang Index

to %ΔGDP ratios for these SE Asian countries.

Table 1: Keqiang Index to %ΔGDP Ratios of SE Asian Countries.

Year	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Vietnam
1996	2.713811528	1.673240269	1.361312767
1997	1.747646689	2.247886689	1.582593906
1998	3.274421385	-0.7760026179	1.917287151
1999	2.094238606	11.88999257	2.627109854
2000	1.547608375	2.006177998	3.130086413
2001	3.92369688	2.383169581	2.757856393
2002	2.368922032	1.571493423	1.777348437
2003	1.821966097	1.535254627	2.964558181
2004	2.403207898	2.02204347	1.720076895
2005	1.478809618	2.116930712	2.23972443
2006	1.787358422	1.307608729	2.376551723
2007	0.975028462	2.178339064	2.201387243
2008	2.546983566	3.253316777	2.653319976
2009	1.624402384	1.682466417	3.878138431
2010	2.126234955	2.378207697	2.60195464
2011	1.723308144	2.5458456	1.615062026
2012	1.053985921	2.502544853	1.37021208
2013	0.5142076344	2.847487403	1.585031244
2014	2.586771923	1.350356408	2.028121663
2015	1.280738472	1.516806353	1.645300704
2016	3.276938518	1.165584266	1.105786472
2017	1.828754938	2.490893953	1.890307141
2018	1.305812071	1.624420622	1.767825233
2019	2.60477386	1.18779605	1.576504641
Avg. Error	2.025401182	2.279244205	2.098894068

At this point we validated that the Keqiang Index to %ΔGDP ratios of the SE Asian countries chosen were about the same through time. We notice that on average, the Keqiang Index to %ΔGDP ratios of the SE Asian countries was about 2.0-2.2 between the years of 1996 and 2019 inclusive. Therefore, we expect China to also follow this ratio as well, at least for years when China was industrializing and relied heavily on manufacturing for most of its economic activity.

To check this, we gathered outstanding bank loans, electricity consumption, and annual rail freight data for China in order to construct a Chinese Keqiang Index. From there, we divide the Chinese Keqiang Index by the average of SE Asian Keqiang to %ΔGDP ratios in order to generate an Expected Chinese GDP growth rate. We compare this Expected Chinese GDP growth rate to the official Reported Chinese GDP Growth rate to check whether Chinese Economic Growth data is accurate based on the Keqiang index.

2.1 Sources of Data

Data on individual countries' outstanding bank loans was found in the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database.

Data on individual countries' electricity consumption was found through DataCommons [3].

Data on individual countries' GDP growth and rail freight were found in the World Bank database [1].

Information regarding the Keqiang Index was found in an article by The Hedge Fund Journal [5]. This article

118 gives a quick synopsis of the Keqiang Index and directly
119 compares the Chinese Keqiang Index to its reported GPA
120 and a variety of other important graphs.

121 3 Results and Discussion

Table 2: Reported GDP growth minus expected GDP growth per year using the Keqiang Index.

Year	China	Bangladesh	Vietnam	Indonesia
1996	5.250%	-1.873%	2.693%	0.989%
1997	5.255%	-0.388%	1.221%	-0.982%
1998	3.153%	-5.256%	-1.755%	-20.006%
1999	6.098%	2.695%	2.523%	-0.918%
2000	1.702%	1.757%	-2.753%	0.488%
2001	4.884%	0.165%	0.541%	0.761%
2002	6.220%	-2.042%	0.425%	0.790%
2003	-2.465%	0.204%	-2.807%	1.303%
2004	6.586%	-2.426%	1.202%	0.064%
2005	5.821%	1.406%	-1.136%	-0.503%
2006	5.249%	-0.258%	-2.121%	1.557%
2007	6.327%	3.822%	-1.657%	-1.389%
2008	6.715%	1.481%	0.333%	-0.927%
2009	2.423%	1.202%	-3.344%	1.369%
2010	4.356%	-0.234%	-0.630%	-0.025%
2011	3.721%	0.789%	1.130%	-1.847%
2012	2.869%	2.649%	0.911%	-3.143%
2013	2.634%	4.098%	0.217%	-4.071%
2014	4.753%	-2.486%	-0.128%	1.604%
2015	4.065%	0.460%	-0.777%	-0.119%
2016	3.090%	-4.594%	2.694%	1.849%
2017	2.316%	0.151%	0.599%	-1.037%
2018	-0.386%	0.713%	-0.928%	-0.194%
2019	0.504%	2.952%	0.858%	1.682%
Avg. Error	3.797%	0.208%	-0.112%	-0.946%

122 In 1998, Indonesia had an error of -20%, which is sig-
123 nificant. To address that issue, we looked at the reported
124 GDP growth then, which was a whopping -13.1%. During
125 1998, there was a period of political unrest that led to the
126 resignation of long-lasting dictator Suharto, explaining the
127 dip in GDP growth. Therefore, we believe that 1998 in In-
128 donesia is an anomaly in terms of the relationship between
129 the Keqiang Index and GDP growth.

130 After compiling all the data, we predict that official Chi-
131 nese GDP figures have over-reported their data by an av-
132 erage of 3.797% between 1996 to 2019 inclusive. This is
133 significant; for reference, the U.S grew 2.3% in 2019. To
134 verify our data, we calculated the average error of the cho-
135 sen Southeast Asian countries and found that the average
136 error of each selected country was under one percent.

137 Because the average errors of Bangladesh, Vietnam,
138 and Indonesia are all under one percent, we expect that
139 Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Indonesia have been reporting
140 their economic growth relatively accurately. Consistent
141 with skepticism of Chinese Economic Growth data, our
142 analysis shows that the Chinese economic numbers are in-
143 flated.

144 Given our previous assertion that China has been moving
145 towards a service-based industry, especially since 2010, we

146 also just looked at the pre-2010 period and noticed an even
147 bigger discrepancy. From 1996 through 2009, our analy-
148 sis indicates that China has overstated its GDP growth by
149 about 4.52% a year.

Table 3: Reported GDP growth minus expected GDP growth per year using the Keqiang Index. Truncated to only the pre-2010 period.

Year	China	Bangladesh	Vietnam	Indonesia
1996	5.250%	-1.873%	2.693%	0.989%
1997	5.255%	-0.388%	1.221%	-0.982%
1998	3.153%	-5.256%	-1.755%	-20.006%
1999	6.098%	2.695%	2.523%	-0.918%
2000	1.702%	1.757%	-2.753%	0.488%
2001	4.884%	0.165%	0.541%	0.761%
2002	6.220%	-2.042%	0.425%	0.790%
2003	-2.465%	0.204%	-2.807%	1.303%
2004	6.586%	-2.426%	1.202%	0.064%
2005	5.821%	1.406%	-1.136%	-0.503%
2006	5.249%	-0.258%	-2.121%	1.557%
2007	6.327%	3.822%	-1.657%	-1.389%
2008	6.715%	1.481%	0.333%	-0.927%
2009	2.423%	1.202%	-3.344%	1.369%
Avg. Error	4.52%	0.03%	-0.47%	-1.24%

Table 4: Ratio between Keqiang Index and reported GDP growth per year.

Year	China	Bangladesh	Vietnam	Indonesia
1996	0.90	2.71	1.36	1.67
1997	0.80	2.02	1.58	2.25
1998	0.88	2.96	1.92	-0.78
1999	1.13	2.36	2.63	11.89
2000	1.78	1.49	3.13	2.01
2001	1.25	2.92	2.76	2.38
2002	0.61	2.93	1.78	1.57
2003	2.62	2.02	2.96	1.54
2004	0.71	3.00	1.72	2.02
2005	0.95	1.52	2.24	2.12
2006	1.07	1.89	2.38	1.31
2007	0.99	0.82	2.20	2.18
2008	0.86	2.12	2.65	3.25
2009	1.78	1.82	3.88	1.68
2010	1.40	2.47	2.60	2.38
2011	1.20	1.72	1.62	2.55
2012	1.04	0.97	1.37	2.50
2013	1.09	0.52	1.59	2.85
2014	0.72	2.80	2.03	1.35
2015	0.63	1.38	1.65	1.52
2016	1.01	3.05	1.11	1.17
2017	1.38	2.02	1.89	2.49
2018	1.66	1.41	1.77	1.62
2019	1.64	1.12	1.58	1.19
Avg. Ratio	1.17	2.00	2.10	2.28

150 There seems to be another discrepancy; In 1999, Indone-
151 sia had a Keqiang to reported GDP growth ratio of 11.89.
152 To explain this, we once again took a look back at the re-
153 ported GDP then and saw that Indonesian data reported 0.8
154 growth. So when we divided the reported GDP by the Ke-
155 qiang growth (9.512%), it resulted in an increased number.
156 This means that the higher the ratio is, the less reported

157 GDP growth/loss there was in that year. On top of that, the
 158 opposite applies, meaning that if the average reported GDP
 159 change is high (like in the case of China with a change of
 160 8.957%) the ratio will be smaller, further showing skepti-
 161 cism of reported GDP figures.

162 We also averaged each country's Keqiang to reported
 163 GDP growth ratio, and observed that the ratio for China
 164 is around 1.2 while the ratio for the other three countries
 165 it's around 2.1. This again shows that the Keqiang Index to
 166 reported GDP growth ratio is relatively consistent for other
 167 manufacture-reliant countries, while it diverges for China
 168 (presumably because of overstated GDP growth).

Table 5: Yearly expected GDP growth using the Keqiang Index.

Year	China	Bangladesh	Vietnam	Indonesia
1996	4.673%	6.373%	6.607%	6.811%
1997	3.982%	4.888%	6.979%	5.682%
1998	4.693%	10.456%	7.555%	6.906%
1999	1.564%	2.005%	2.277%	1.718%
2000	6.788%	3.543%	9.553%	4.412%
2001	3.452%	4.935%	5.659%	2.839%
2002	2.914%	5.842%	5.875%	3.710%
2003	12.503%	4.496%	9.707%	3.497%
2004	3.528%	7.626%	6.298%	4.936%
2005	5.574%	5.094%	8.636%	6.203%
2006	7.472%	6.958%	9.121%	3.943%
2007	7.904%	3.278%	8.757%	7.689%
2008	2.936%	4.519%	5.367%	6.927%
2009	6.976%	3.798%	8.744%	3.231%
2010	6.280%	5.834%	7.030%	6.225%
2011	5.830%	5.711%	5.270%	8.047%
2012	4.995%	3.851%	4.589%	9.143%
2013	5.132%	1.902%	5.383%	9.671%
2014	2.673%	8.586%	6.528%	3.396%
2015	2.976%	6.140%	7.777%	5.019%
2016	3.759%	11.694%	4.006%	3.151%
2017	4.631%	6.449%	6.301%	6.137%
2018	7.136%	6.587%	8.128%	5.394%
2019	5.447%	4.948%	6.342%	3.318%
Avg. Expected GDP Growth	5.159%	5.646%	6.770%	5.334%

169 We also averaged each country's predicted GDP growth
 170 to compare economic growth between the four countries
 171 and found that all three Southeast Asian countries av-
 172 eraged higher than China. This makes sense, as those
 173 three countries are heavily industrial developing economies
 174 while China is shifting more towards a service-based econ-
 175 omy. Vietnam in particular has an especially high average
 176 growth, but that isn't odd. More and more companies have
 177 been moving production to Vietnam. David Hutt from DW
 178 notes that the reason for this is in part due to lower salaries
 179 in Vietnam than in China, and a deteriorating relationship
 180 between the EU and China [4].

181 4 Conclusion

182 We can conclude that China has most likely overreported
 183 its GDP growth numbers, and based on our calculated pre-
 184 dicted GDP growth China is no longer industrializing at
 185 the rate it once was. This may be a sign that China is soon
 186 going to become a developed nation with a service-based
 187 economy. However, this does still beg the question: how
 188 much of Chinese growth being reported now is based on

189 economic activity, and how much of it is based on bureau-
 190 cratic manipulation and to meet central planning targets.

191 Additionally, we can conclude that for countries with a
 192 heavily manufacturing-based economy, the ratio between
 193 that country's Keqiang index and reported GDP growth
 194 per year should be around 2; This ratio might be useful in
 195 the future to evaluate how close other countries, especially
 196 third-world countries, in industrializing, or becoming a de-
 197 veloping nation, allowing for people/companies to invest
 198 in those respective countries. Further research still needs
 199 to be done, however, to verify this ratio and see whether or
 200 not it is a good way to evaluate economic activity.

201 4.1 Further Discussions and Implementa- 202 tions

203 After analyzing expected Chinese GDP growth, we did
 204 a little more analysis of each country's average expected
 205 GDP growth. We averaged each decade's predicted GDP
 206 growth to take a look at growth from a broader view.

Table 6: Average predicted GDP growth per decade.

-	China	Bangladesh	Vietnam	Indonesia
Average predicted GDP growth from 2000-2009	6.01%	5.01%	7.77%	4.74%
Average predicted GDP growth from 2010-2019	4.89%	6.17%	6.14%	5.95%

207 In the 2000s, China averaged a high 6.01% in growth,
 208 normal for a rapidly industrializing country. However,
 209 from 2010 to 2019, GDP growth in China dropped down to
 210 an average of 4.89%. This is still relatively high but shows
 211 signs of a slowdown in rapid industrialization, especially
 212 when compared to the other three countries. Bangladesh
 213 and Indonesia both have increased in economic growth over
 214 the decade, while Vietnam, although having decreased in
 215 growth, still remains at high levels of growth. China may
 216 be finally at the end of its road as a developing country and
 217 finally transitioning to a developed country, with a GDP
 218 more influenced by services rather than manufacturing.

219 But what will happen if China finally becomes a de-
 220 veloped nation? From a supply chain perspective, we
 221 don't think much will change. Manufacturing will still
 222 most likely come from other Southeast Asian countries
 223 such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The signif-
 224 icance of that is that supply chains will still remain one-
 225 directional, beginning from Southeast Asia and traveling
 226 to developed countries, meaning that global supply chains
 227 will still be too volatile, as shown by the COVID-19 pan-
 228 demic. However, because of the proximity of China to
 229 these other southeast Asian countries, this slowdown in
 230 economic growth might actually benefit China, as they still
 231 retain a nearby manufacturing base while transitioning off
 232 reliance on its own manufacturing.

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258 leader, December 2010.
- 276 – In the edges - we averaged the data from all the
277 dates we had and used that number to fill in the
278 gaps
279 – In the middle - we used linear interpolation (we
280 took the last values before and after the gap,
281 averaged the rate of change, and then linearly
282 changed the number each year)
- 283 • Here are screenshots of our data so far (for each coun-
284 try) *Note highlighted areas are estimated (see above):
- 285 – China
286 – Vietnam
287 – Indonesia
288 – Bangladesh
- 289 We then calculated the ratio of Keqiang Index to %
290 change in GDP, then multiplied that ratio to the Keqiang
291 Index change to predict a country's GDP
- 292 • Here are screenshots of these calculations (for each
293 country):
- 294 – China
295 – Vietnam
296 – Indonesia
297 – Bangladesh

5 Appendix I: Additional Resources and Process

261 We noted these datas for China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and
262 Bangladesh (from 1995 - 2019) on an excel sheet

- 263 • Outstanding Bank Loans (China, Vietnam, Indonesia,
264 Bangladesh)
- 265 • Electricity Consumption (Link used)
- 266 • Rail Freight (Link Used - Downloaded excel sheet to
267 see individual countries)
- 268 • GDP Growth (China, Vietnam, Indonesia,
269 Bangladesh)

270 To calculate the Keqiang Indices (for each country), we
271 calculated the rate of change for bank loans, electricity con-
272 sumption, and rail freight; Then we took 40% of the change
273 in bank loans, 40% of the electricity consumption, and 20%
274 of the rail freight to calculate the Keqiang Indices.

- 275 • For gaps in the data: